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intelligence agencies in recent years has been enormous and unprecedented. The cloak of secrecy began unraveling in 1960 with the U-2 incident in which President Eisenhower made the unprecedented admission that the United States spies on the Soviet Union by all feasible means. A year later, the Bay of Pigs fiasco trumpeted to all the world that the United States engaged, if ineptly, in covert operations. The secrecy garment was torn again in 1967 when it was disclosed that the CIA was secretly subsidizing dozens of American private organizations. Late 1974, however, became the watershed period, when the New York Times disclosed in detail that the CIA had been engaged in domestic spying in violation of its congressional charter. Coupled with CIA complicity in the Watergate scandal, this disclosure began the new era in U.S. intelligence history, initiating a still-continuing avalanche of disclosures about assassination plots, drug testing, mail opening, etc. and of published materials on the intelligence system. This essay focuses on the period since 1974. Up to that time, there was a modest literature on contemporary intelligence, but much of it lacked authenticated, concrete evidence or examples.
The post-1974 literature can be divided into four major categories. First are the personal memoirs of former intelligence professionals, usually written with the help or encouragement of the intelligence system. Such literature is normally reviewed and "sanitized" by intelligence authorities prior to publication. In a second category are the "whistle-blowing" exposes, written by disgruntled former intelligence professionals, reformist journalists or activists. These works are normally not cleared by government censors and in some cases have been impeded by litigation or judicial injunction. In the third category are the social scientists attempting to analyze objectively some aspect of intelligence activities, working primarily from non-secret sources. In a fourth category are the large number of congressional and executive branch studies, hearings and reports, which reflect the compromises of facts and values required by the American competitive political process.
Several basic questions constitute starting points towards an understanding of intelligence policy. These include: what was the CIA supposed to be when it was created by Congress in 1947? What did it become, and why? What has been the nature and quality of its performance? And what ought to be the future structure and functions of a national intelligence system within the American democratic framework? From studying these questions one would hope to see political science served by the development of understanding of the variables that determine how intelligence systems work and of clearly defined criteria for objectively evaluating performance and product. Let us examine publications in the various categories to determine what light they shed on these questions.
Accounts from Inside the Establishment
In the first category are several notable memoirs. Of the recent books by former high-level insiders, William Colby's Honorable Men is the most valuable. Only in America could a former intelligence director write a book that candidly discusses his recent experience. Not since Allen Dulles, whose The Craft of Intelligence appeared in 1963, has a former CIA Director published a book. Colby's work, written with Peter Forbath, is an important contribution because of his extensive experience from World War II to detente in the wide range of intelligence activities, and the constitutional issues raised. He was deeply involved in the cold war, the Vietnam War, "Third-World" covert operations, and in managing the CIA "scandal" and response to congressional investigations. The book is more useful than the Dulles book, which was uncritical about, and insensitive to, the problem of a secret establishment in a democracy. As might be expected, Colby defends the intelligence system and its record, playing down its failures and its foibles, but his book is no whitewash and he understands the dilemmas posed by secret operations. Colby defines the problem as "threading the thin line between responding to the Congress' constitutional right to know and protecting legitimate intelligence secrets" (p. 13 book on some of the major policy issues, yet it offers considerable detail from an insider's view-being essentially an apology for the intelligence system. Cline served in high intelligence positions in both the CIA and the State Department. Cline offers his book as a "contribution to political science" (p. xii), yet other than his detailed proposals for reforming the structure of the intelligence system, he offers few generalizations or conceptual progress. Perhaps the problem is that he became imbued with the netherworld of secrecy and was unable to step into the role of objective critic of the system for which he worked so long. As he puts it: "The rarified atmosphere of clandestine work intrigued me" (p. 17 1). Because he was actionoriented, Cline became a clandestine operator, serving as CIA Chief of Station in Taiwan from 1958 to 1962.
Although Cline is generally defensive about, and an apologist for, most of the CIA's activities over the past 30 years, he nonetheless concludes his memoir by proposing a radical structural change that essentially would separate intelligence analysis from clandestine activities. Cline's book is not a systematic survey of intelligence in the political process; it is chiefly valuable as a personal memoir adding some significant insight into the mind-set of an educated intelligence officer and some important details as to the intelligence organization's historical evolution, particularly under Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.
William R. Corson's The Armies of Ignorance (1977) is one of the most useful secondary sources yet published. It is not exactly a memoir, although the author had a long career as a military intelligence professional with a wide variety of assignments in politico-military intelligence work that gave him good insights into secret intelligence. Nor is it entirely a secondary source, for the author has included all-too-numerous verbatim reprints of important official documents. Many of these are fascinating but they tend to clutter up the analysis. Throughout the long book, important "pre-theory" questions are raised. Unfortunately, Corson did not deal with the topic systematically and the book has the quality of a rough draft of what might have been one of the modern intelligence classics. It falls short of that distinction by its discursiveness and loose organization. Perhaps the book's most suggestive section is its first chapter in which the author interprets how a growing intelligence empire has responded to each successive presidency, starting with Truman. The author's general proposition is that "each of the new presidents has come to his role [as first intelligence officer] unprepared to take it over" (p. 4). More often than not, the intelligence system has, in Corson's view, managed to co-opt the presidency. This is an exceptionally insightful inside view of the bureaucratic maneuverings underlying the growth of the American intelligence "empire." Anyone with a serious interest in the organizational growth of the U.S. intelligence system and the interplay of intelligence agency politics cannot ignore this book. It is a valuable resource and reference, although it will be hard going for the general reader, for whom a book half its length would have been more useful.
David Atlee Phillips resigned from the CIA in 1975 to organize former U.S. intelligence officers into the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers and to write The Night T'atch (1977). Like his efforts to organize an intelligence lobby, his book is a personal memoir designed to spread the CIA gospel-and presumably to counter Philip Agee's Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1 975) (discussed below). Phillips guides the reader through his career, from the time he was recruited by the CIA in Chile, to his assignment as station chief in Brazil and Venezuela and ultimately as chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the clandestine services. He was deeply involved in covert actions in Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Phillips has less new to reveal for the historical record of events involving these various notions than he does about the character and personality of intelligence professionals and their world outlook. Essentially, life and secret operations appear to them a game to be approached sometimes gleefully, sometimes cynically. With this book as basis, one finds it difficult to take seriously the clandestine "tradecraft." Essentially, the book takes for granted that the U.S. must conduct covert operations. Phillips does not offer an adequate rationale for such activities; excitement and adventure appear to be the motivating forces for covert operators. Another message that comes through is that the CIA tends to be a personal instrument of the president. This book adds savory spice but too little of substance to the intelligence pudding. (1977) is an example of a rare effort to study the prime intelligence function of informing decision makers of events and prospects abroad, and to evaluate how successfully the intelligence system has performed that function. Freedman also explores the process of producing intelligence estimates and how the structure affects the product and its influence. His analysis is based not only on the published record but also on interviews with some of the principal actors. The substance of the analysis centers on six case studies, including the "missile gap," the debate over antiballistic missiles, and the search for an invulnerable deterrent. The author's analysis suffers from the lack of access to actual intelligence estimates and more fundamentally the absence of a theory of intelligence. This absence makes it difficult to categorize intelligence "failures" or "successes." Freedman's principal finding is that the perception of external threats is a political process in which prevailing strategic doctrine and U.S. policy makers' attitudes towards defense spending and arms control are as crucial in determining policy as are the intelligence estimates. The book helpfully explodes the myth that perfect intelligence would resolve all policy disputes. 
Another book focusing on the internal activities of the intelligence agencies is Spying on

Conclusions
In sum, the executive purpose and the legislative intent in creating the CIA remain somewhat obscure. Nonetheless, for two decades in the context of cold war consensus, the CIA became the multi-functional agency that operated world-wide in intelligence analysis, espionage, counter-intelligence and covert political action. Now that the consensus has evaporated, evaluating CIA's multi-faceted performance is the challenge, and a necessity. Available but incomplete evidence seems to support the proposition that intelligence has too often seriously failed to forewarn policy makers and that in covert political action costs have exceeded benefits. As of this writing, after five years of executive commissions, congressional hearings and reports and an unending volume of literature of the type described, the executivecongressional decision-making structure has been unable to reach a new consensus on a redesigned intelligence system, legitimized by a "charter" that precisely defines functions and sets limits. I believe this to be a fundamental policy requirement.
Even if answers to certain historical ques. tions remain elusive, what aggregate theoretical knowledge is derivable from the recent literature? Systematic research requires that events and relationships be observable. With respect to secret intelligence, not only are concepts poorly defined, but also many events and relationships are obscured from scholarly observation by secrecy. Even those who have been intelligence professionals normally have worked in tight compartments, and have themselves had access to very limited views of systems and behaviors. Empirical evidence needed for a systemic overview consequently has been in short supply. The above-cited expansion of the bibliographical foundation since 1974, however, offers a wealth of new evidence, suggesting new research frontiers. Perhaps the time is at hand for conceptual progress, inviting the first few steps down the long road to theories of intelligence.
From years of reading and reflection on strategic intelligence, I am convinced that the functions of intelligence constitute the largest gap in our understanding of how foreign policy decisions are made. Discussions of intelligence "failure" abound, but we lack an acceptable theory of intelligence that permits systematic evaluations of performance by clearly defined criteria. The elaborate intelligence process includes a number of steps, from the setting of information requirements to the use of processed information in decisional choice. An understanding of how this process works has been severely hampered by secrecy. If knowledge is power, then political science badly needs better knowledge of the intelligence structure and process. Without it, the descriptive, let alone the explanatory or predictive, power of the discipline remains seriously deficient.
Until disproved, the following hypotheses, partly intuitive, appear to represent reality: intelligence systems tend to report what they think the political leadership wants to hear, and whatever is reported, leaders often take actions without regard for the intelligence reports. If it is true, intelligence makes little difference in policy formation. The unwise decisions after 1947 to combine the disparate functions of foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert political action under the CIA roof have compounded the problem of structuring a proper relationship among secret information, policy making and action in foreign affairs. Intelligence may be less a policy determinant and more an ingredient to be manipulated by policy makers. Once in power, leaders seem compelled to support the maintenance of secrecy. Probably this is because leaders discover that control of secret information provides the leverage for political power. Concerns about the information-power relationship are perhaps the hidden agenda in the current politics of restruc-
